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IntroductIon
In information systems, authentication involves, traditionally, 
sharing a secret with the authenticating entity and presenting 
it whenever a confirmation of the user’s identity is needed. 
In the digital era, that secret is commonly a user name and 
password pair and/or, sometimes, a biometric feature. Both 
present difficulties of different kinds once the traditional user 
name and password are no longer enough to protect these 
infrastructures, the privacy of those who use it, and the con-
fidentiality of the information, having known vulnerabilities, 
and the second has many issues related to ethical and social 
implications of its use (Magalhães & Santos, 2005).  
 Password vulnerabilities come from their misuse that, 
in turn, results from the fact that they need to be both easy to 
remember, therefore simple, and secure, therefore complex. 
Consequently, it is virtually impossible to come up with a 
good password (Wiedenbeck, Waters, Birget, Brodskiy, & 
Memon, 2005). On the other hand, once users realize the 
need for securing their authentication secrets, even fairly 
good passwords become a threat when the security policies 
(if at all existing) fail to be implemented. The results of an 
inquiry made by the authors in 2004 to 60 IT professionals 
show that, even among those that have technical knowledge, 
the need for password security is underestimated (Magalhães, 
Revett, & Santos, 2006). This is probably one of the reasons 
why the governments increased their investment in biometric 
technologies after the terrorist attack of 9/11 (International 
Biometric Group [IBG], 2003).
The use of biometric technologies to increase the se-
curity of a system has become a widely discussed subject, 
but while governments and corporations are pressing for 
a wider integration of these technologies with common 
security systems (like passports or identity cards), human 
rights associations are concerned with the ethical and social 
implications of their use. This situation creates a challenge 
to find biometric algorithms that are less intrusive, easier to 
use, and more accurate. 
The precision of a biometric technology is measured by 
its false-acceptance rate (FAR), which measures the perme-
ability of the algorithm to attacks; its false-rejection rate 
(FRR), which measures the resistance of the algorithm to 
accept a legitimate user; and its crossover error rate (CER), 
the point of intersection of the FAR curve with the FRR 
curve that indicates the level of usability of the technology 
(Figure 1). For a biometric technology to be usable on a 
stand-alone base, its CER must be under 1%. As an algorithm 
becomes more demanding, its FAR is lower and its FRR is 
higher. Usually the administrator of the system can define a 
threshold and decide what the average FAR and FRR of the 
applied algorithm will be according to the need for security, 
which depends on the risk evaluation and the value of what 
is protected; also, the threshold can be, in theory, defined by 
an intrusion detection system (software designed to identify 
situations of attack to the system).
Establishing the error rates of a biometric technology is 
a complex problem. Studies have been made to normalize 
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their evaluation, but the fact is that the results are strongly 
dependent on the number of individuals involved in the pro-
cess and, what is worst, on who is chosen. This means that, 
even with a large amount of data collected, the results can 
be very different if we change the evaluated group. The lack 
of trust in the precision evaluation methodologies and values 
is one of the reasons why the human rights associations are 
opposing the generalization of use of biometric technologies 
and their acceptance as standards for authentication proce-
dures (Privacy International, Statewatch, & European Digital 
Rights, 2004). Even so, in an inquiry made by Epaynews 
(http://www.epaynews.com), 36% of users stated that they 
would prefer to use biometric authentication when using 
credit cards, a value only comparable to the use of personal 
identification numbers (PINs) and much higher than the 9% 
of authentication obtained by signature.
Considering all the advantages and disadvantages of 
biometric procedures, it seems that the only way is to allow 
the user a choice. Being so, the traditional password systems 
must be enhanced both in the biometrical way and in another 
completely different way. On the biometric component we 
propose keystroke dynamics, a biometrical authentication 
algorithm that tries do define a user’s typing pattern and 
then verifies in each log-in attempt if the pattern existing in 
the way the password was typed matches the user’s known 
pattern; it is the only biometric technology that can be used 
with the existing log-in and password systems without requir-
ing any extra hardware. On the nonbiometric component, 
we propose the use of a graphical authentication system, a 
log-in system that verifies the user’s knowledge of specific 
images or parts of images to grant or deny successful log-
in, because it has been proven that it provides a wider key 
space and because it can be used to generate complex secret 
strings from simple passgraphs (the user’s secret code to 
access a system protected by a graphical authentication 
system, constituted by a sequence of points where the user 
must click in order to obtain a successful log-in).
Background
keystroke dynamics
As in many other problems, there have been two different 
approaches to the challenge of finding an algorithm for key-
stroke dynamics that minimizes the CER: machine learning 
and deterministic algorithms. 
Among the solutions based on machine learning, we can 
find the work presented by Ord and Furnell (2000) that tested 
this technology with a 14-person group to study the viability 
of applying it to the simple use of PINs typed on a numeric 
pad. Unfortunately, the results suggest that, for large-scale 
use, the technology is not feasible. Deterministic algorithms 
have been applied to keystroke dynamics since the late ’70s. 
In 1980, Gaines et al. (1980) presented a report on the study 
of the typing patterns of seven professional typists. The 
small number of volunteers and the fact that the algorithm 
is deducted from their data and not tested for other people 
later results in lower confidence in the FAR and FRR values 
presented. However, the method used to establish a pattern 
was a breakthrough: the study of the time spent to type the 
same two letters (digraph) when together in the text. Since 
then, many algorithms based on algebra and on probability 
and statistics have been presented. Joyce and Gupta presented 
in 1990 an algorithm to calculate a value that represents 
the distance between acquired keystroke latency times and 
correspondent times previously stored. In 1997, Monrose 
and Rubin used the Euclidean distance and probabilistic 
calculations based on the assumption that the latency times 
for one digraph exhibits a normal distribution. Later in 2000, 
they also presented an algorithm for identification based on 
the similarity models of Bayes, and in 2001 they presented 
an algorithm that uses polynomials and vector spaces to 
generate complex passwords from a simple one using the 
keystroke pattern (Monrose et al., 2001).
In 2005, Magalhães, Revett, and Santos presented an 
improvement of the Joyce and Gupta algorithm and tested 
it with 170.391 attacks to 143 patterns, obtaining a 0% FAR 
with an FRR of 26%, and an estimated CER below 5%.
graphical authentication Systems
A graphical authentication system is a log-in system that 
verifies the user’s knowledge of specific images or parts 
of images to grant or deny successful log-in. Greg Blonder 
(1996) was the first to describe graphical passwords, present-
ing in a United States patent a system that would allow users 
to choose a picture, the number of regions to be clicked, and 
their sizes and positions. Since then, many variations of this 
system were presented and images have gained their way 
into the authentication processes. 
Among the most popular graphical authentication sys-
tems, we find PassfacesTM from the Passfaces Corporation 
(2005), a commercial system where the user chooses a previ-
ously selected face from a set of faces and repeats this process 
for different faces in different sets for a defined number of 
times. However, being popular does not imply being secure, 
and a study of the users’ choices demonstrated that they are, 
in some cases, similar for all users. For instance, 10% of the 
passwords of males could have been guessed with only two 
attempts (Davies, Monrose, & Reiter, 2004).
The déjà vu scheme involves a matrix of m images in a 
set, where n images are part of the user’s portfolio, previ-
ously chosen from a set of proposed images. The user must 
identify those n images to log in.
The draw-a-secret (DAS) scheme is a graphical authen-
tication system with an approach completely different. In 
DAS, the user draws something over a grid that becomes the 
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authentication secret. This system has been implemented with 
success on PDAs (personal digital assistants) and further stud-
ies will be made to analyse the users’ choices and acceptance 
(Jermyn, Mayer, Monrose, Reiter, & Rubin, 1999). 
In the visual identification protocol (VIP) several pos-
sibilities were created. From a set of 10 predefined images 
the user chooses 4 placed on the same position and typed 
in the same order (VIP1), or placed in random positions 
(VIP2). VIP3 is a process where four of the eight images 
existing in the user’s portfolio are displayed along with 12 
distractors, and the user must identify them in no particular 
order. The studies showed that the most common errors as-
sociated with VIP1 and VIP2 were related to bad sequences, 
where the identified images are correct but selected in the 
wrong order, and in VIP3 most of the errors were due to the 
wrong identification of the images, for instance, any flower 
being considered as the chosen flower (de Angeli, Coventry, 
Johnson, & Coutts, 2003).
In 2006, Magalhães et al. presented a graphical authen-
tication system that included letters and numbers in images 
with the objective of allowing PDA users to click their user 
names in an easy way. From that system they discovered 
that the selection of the image and the rules that control the 
choice of passgraphs are critical factors in the success of the 
implementation of this kind of system. In particular, they 
found that users have a common tendency to choose the first 
available images, and that the use of images with corners 
and the existence of letters placed in a row create serious 
vulnerabilities to the system. Eyes are also a common choice 
and should be avoided. Therefore, the results suggest the use 
of images without corners, like nature images, cut in a round 
form. If the choice of keeping the letters is made, they must 
be placed in a random way throughout the images. Another 
dangerous tendency is the use of passgraphs constituted 
by regions placed in the same row or in the same column, 
therefore the system must reject the choice of passgraphs 
that meet this criteria, forcing the users to navigate inside 
the image by demanding the use of at least two different 
rows and two different columns.
enhancement oF log-In and 
paSSword SyStemS 
Since most of the existing systems trust passwords to pro-
vide access control and considering that passwords are not 
enough, we propose the enhancement of this process by 
adding a new module to the authentication system. This 
module gives two options to the user: a password with 
biometric control (keystroke dynamics) or a passgraph. If 
the user chooses the password system, he or she will be 
prompted (Figure 2) to enter the password several times 
in order to establish a pattern (this is called the enrollment 
process), and the everyday authentication process is, from 
the user’s point of view, exactly the same as it was before 
the introduction of our module. 
Each time that a user enters a password for authentica-
tion, the window captures both the characters stroked and the 
times between successive actions (pressing a key, releasing 
the key, pressing another key, and so on). The module verifies 
if the sequence of times matches the stored pattern (locally 
or in a portable device, like a smart card) and if (and only 
if) it does, the sequence of characters is sent to the original 
password authentication system that will verify correctness 
and allow or deny access to the user. Therefore, we have 
introduced another layer of security (biometrics) without 
any extra effort or equipment. 
If the user chooses to use a passgraph, avoiding the 
biometrics component, he or she will have to choose several 
positions in an image. These positions, clicked in the same 
sequence, will be the secret access code of that user. Figure 
3 shows a possible authentication window with a place to 
choose one of several possible images (in this case, the 
choice Mozart is the one that is active) and a place to enter 
the user name (in this case, the student’s identification num-
ber). Nevertheless, this image would not be a good choice 
since it is not compliant with the best procedures in image 
selection for authentication, as described before.
Each time a user enters a passgraph, the sequence of 
clicks is transformed by a unidirectional function into a 
complex string that is passed into the original password 
field of the hosting system. In this way, we have obtained 
a simple and easy-to-memorize way of having extremely 
complex passwords. 
As a last remark, one should notice that passgraph-area 
technology is very vulnerable to eavesdropping and, there-
fore, are more suitable for access made in private environ-
Figure 2. Keystroke-dynamics enrollment window
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ments or on small portable devices, like smart phones or 
PDAs.
Future trendS
Future work in this field will focus on improving the algo-
rithms for keystroke dynamics, namely by combining the 
recent results provided by the artificial intelligence systems 
with the existing statistical algorithms.
Concerning passgraphs, studies are needed to improve 
the algorithms that convert the sequence of clicks into a 
sequence of characters and to improve the quality of the 
guidelines for image selection. This technology can also be 
integrated with other information security technologies in 
order to maximize their potential. On the other hand, artifi-
cial intelligence techniques can also be used to understand 
further more the use of secret codes in order to improve the 
quality of the proposed systems.
concluSIon
In conclusion, we can say that the technology has achieved 
a way to overcome, at least to a certain point, the entropy 
generated by users that continues to proceed in a way that is 
not the most efficient concerning security. Assuming human 
behaviour as a fact, ways were found to achieve best practices 
in security (like complex passwords) from the normal and 
traditional practices of users.
We have verified that keystroke dynamics and graphical 
authentication systems can, when used together, improve 
the security of the traditional log-in and password systems 
without adding significant complexity to their use and avoid-
ing the ethical problems generated by biometrics when they 
are presented not as a choice but as an imposition. In fact, 
not only do these systems not present any ethical problems 
(when used together and leaving to the user the choice of 
which one to use), they can even provide a good use of the 
digital authentication processes by allowing those that cannot 
read or write (and therefore cannot use a password) to use 
the system, a matter especially relevant in the third-world 
countries that are now embracing  new technologies, for 
instance, in electoral processes.
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key termS
Authentication: It is the process of verifying the identity 
alleged by a user who tries to gain access to a system.
Collaborative Biometric Technology: It is a biometric 
authentication technology that requires the user’s voluntary 
and intended participation in the process. It opposes the 
stealth biometric technologies that can be used without the 
user’s consent. 
Crossover Error Rate (CER): Authentication algo-
rithms need to simultaneously minimize permeability to 
intruders and maximize the comfort level, therefore they 
have to be both demanding and permissive. This contradic-
tion is the base for the optimisation problem in authentica-
tion algorithms, and the measure of success for the overall 
precision of an algorithm and its usability is the CER, the 
value obtained at the threshold that provides the same false-
acceptance rate and false-rejection rate. 
False-Acceptance Rate (FAR): This rate is a measure 
of the permeability of an authentication algorithm. It is cal-
culated by dividing the number of the intruder’s successful 
log-in attempts by the total number of the intruder’s log-in 
attempts. 
False-Rejection Rate (FRR): This rate is a measure 
of the comfort level of an authentication algorithm. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of unsuccessful attempts 
made by legitimate users by the total number of legitimate 
log-in attempts. 
Graphical Authentication System: It is a log-in system 
that verifies the user’s knowledge of specific images or parts 
of images to grant or deny successful log-in.
Identification: It is the process of discovering the iden-
tity of a user who tries to gain access to a system. It differs 
from authentication because in the identification process, no 
identity is proposed to the system, while in authentication, 
an identity is proposed and the system will only verify if 
that identity is plausible.
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Keystroke Dynamics: It is a biometrical authentication 
algorithm that tries do define a user’s typing pattern and then 
verifies in each log-in attempt if the pattern existing in the way 
the password was typed matches the user’s known pattern. 
Another application of keystroke dynamics, at least in theory, 
is the permanent monitoring of the user’s typing pattern in 
order to permanently verify if the user that is typing is the 
legitimate owner of the system’s account being used.
Passgraph: It is the user’s secret code to access a system 
protected by a graphical authentication system. It is consti-
tuted by a sequence of points the user must click in order to 
obtain a successful log-in.
Stealth Biometric Technology: It is a biometric au-
thentication technology that can be used without the user’s 
consent. It opposes the collaborative biometric technologies 
that require the user’s voluntary and intended participation 
in the process.
Threshold: It is the variable that defines the level of 
tolerance of an algorithm. It can be set to a more demand-
ing value, raising the false-rejection rate and lowering the 
false-acceptance rate, or it can be set to a less demanding 
value, lowering the false-rejection rate and raising the false-
acceptance rate.
